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We	determined	 the	presence	of	neutralizing	antibodies	 to	
Middle	East	respiratory	syndrome	coronavirus	in	persons	in	
Qatar	with	and	without	dromedary	contact.	Antibodies	were	
only	detected	in	those	with	contact,	suggesting	dromedary	
exposure	as	a	risk	factor	for	infection.	Findings	also	showed	
evidence	for	substantial	underestimation	of	the	infection	in	
populations	at	risk	in	Qatar.
Since Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) was first detected in 2012, approxi-
mately 1,000 human infections have been reported to the 
World Health Organization, all linked to residence in or 
travel to countries on the Arabian Peninsula (1). Dromedar-
ies (Camelus dromedarius) are thought to play a central 
role in MERS epidemiology because widespread evidence 
of MERS-CoV–specific antibodies and virus shedding in 
camels was found (2), and highly similar viruses have been 
detected in humans and dromedaries at the same location 
(3,4). These data suggest a direct zoonotic risk for MERS-
CoV infection among persons in contact with camels. We 
describe a comparative serologic investigation in Qatar 
among persons with and without daily occupational expo-
sure to dromedaries.
The Study
We used 498 anonymized serum samples from persons in 
Qatar with and without dromedary contact (online Techni-
cal Appendix, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/21/8/15-
0481-Techapp1.pdf) and control serum from Europe (Na-
tional Institute for Public Health and the Environment, 
Bilthoven, the Netherlands; and University of Bonn, Bonn, 
Germany). Sampling in Qatar was cleared by the Ethics 
and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees of the 
Medical Research Center, Hamad Medical Corporation 
(permit 2014-01-001). Samples from the Netherlands were 
used in accordance with the Dutch Federation of Medical 
Scientific Associations’ code of conduct for proper use of 
human tissue. Samples from Germany were used in accor-
dance with German national laws.
Of the 498 samples, 294 were from persons with daily 
occupational contact with dromedaries (cohorts A–D) and 
204 were from persons without camel contact (cohorts 
E–G). Cohort A consisted of 109 healthy workers (5 camel 
slaughterers [subcohort A1] and 104 sheep slaughterers 
[A2]) at the central slaughterhouse in Doha, Qatar. All 
workers lived together and had contact with camels and 
sheep at the central animal market (CAM). Cohort B con-
sisted of 8 CAM workers. Cohort C consisted of 22 healthy 
men living and working at the Al Shahaniya barn complex 
near the international dromedary racing track, and cohort 
D consisted of 155 healthy men living and working on a 
dromedary farm in Dukhan, western Qatar; molecular data 
showed ongoing circulation of MERS-CoV in dromedaries 
in these locations (online Technical Appendix). Cohort E 
consisted of 56 random samples from construction work-
ers in Qatar. Cohort F consisted of 10 samples from per-
sons working and living at a complex with 200 sheep barns 
in northern Qatar. Cohort G consisted of 138 samples for 
confirming specificity of the testing algorithm (66 samples 
from the Netherlands and Germany from persons with re-
cent human CoV infection [subcohort G1] and 72 samples 
from the Netherlands obtained for routine testing from per-
sons with suspected Bordetella pertussis infection [G2]).
We used microarray technology as described (3,5,6) 
to analyze samples for the presence of IgG reactive with 
MERS-CoV S1 antigen (Table). To avoid overinterpreta-
tion of data, we set the reactivity cutoff at 30,000 relative 
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fluorescent units for subsequent analyses (6). Samples from 
20 of 294 persons with camel contact were reactive; no 
control or noncontact samples were reactive. Among camel 
handlers at the Al Shahaniya and Dukhan locations, 4 of 22 
and 8 of 155, respectively, had antibodies to MERS-CoV 
S1. At the CAM, 1 of 8 handlers had antibodies. At the 
slaughterhouse location, 3 of 104 sheep slaughterers and 
4 of 5 camel slaughterers were antibody-positive (Figure). 
Samples from subcohort G1 (n = 66) and from all cam-
el-contact cohorts were tested for antibodies to CoV OC43 
S1, a common human CoV; all showed high seropositivity 
(range 89%–100%) (Figure). All 498 samples were tested 
for reactivity to severe acute respiratory syndrome CoV S1; 
none reacted (Figure).
We used a 90% plaque-reduction neutralization test 
(PRNT90) to confirm the presence of MERS-CoV–specific 
antibodies in serum samples from camel handlers. For test-
ing, we used the 20 samples that were reactive to MERS-
CoV S1 and a random selection of nonreactive samples 
from camel-contact (n = 35) and noncontact (n = 48) co-
horts. Results were positive for 10 of the 20 MERS-CoV 
S1 antibody–positive samples (reciprocal titers of 20 or 
40) (Table).
All but 1 of the 35 samples from persons with camel 
contact who had negative S1 ELISA screening results were 
negative by PRNT90; the positive sample had a reciprocal 
titer of 20 (Table). All 48 samples from the noncontact co-
horts were negative by PRNT90. This finding may indicate an 
underestimation of MERS-CoV seroprevalence by S1 test-
ing. Furthermore, 6 samples from S1-positive and 2 from S1-
negative persons with camel contact showed a reciprocal ti-
ter of 10, but titers of 10 were not observed in the noncontact 
cohorts. Five of these 8 reactive samples were also positive 
in a whole-virus MERS-CoV immunofluorescence assay at 
dilution 1:100; however, we regarded these as negative to 
avoid overinterpretation of data (data not shown).
Conclusions
We detected MERS-CoV neutralizing antibodies in healthy 
persons who had daily occupational contact with drome-
daries but not in persons without such contact. Only limited 
evidence is available regarding the presence of MERS-CoV 
antibodies in the general human population or in specific 
population cohorts. However, an overall seroprevalence of 
0.15% was found in a cross-sectional study in Saudi Ara-
bia, and among slaughterhouse workers, neutralizing anti-
bodies were detected in 5 of 140 participants (7). This find-
ing is similar to our finding among slaughterhouse workers: 
7 of 109 were MERS-CoV antibody–positive. Four other 
studies lacked serologic evidence of MERS-CoV infection 
in humans with occupational exposure to dromedaries (8–
11). However, only 1 of those studies documented actual 
MERS-CoV circulation in dromedaries during human con-
tact, and it was concluded that MERS-CoV was not highly 
transmissible from camels to humans, although only 7 per-
sons had regular contact with only 1 herd (8). On several 
occasions, the percentage of camels shedding MERS-CoV 
was high (60%) at the CAM and slaughterhouse (C.B.E.M. 
Reusken, unpub. data). Thus, locations with a continuous 
flow of dromedaries with different places of origin and dif-
ferent immune statuses may enable prolonged circulation 
of MERS-CoV and sustained exposure of dromedary han-
dlers to the virus; in Qatar, such locations would include 
the CAM, slaughterhouse, and barns near the international 
racing tracks. 
In this study, PRNT90-derived antibody titers were 
relatively low compared with those from earlier studies 
of MERS patients and dromedaries (2); B.L. Haagmans, 
unpub. data). The lower titers might reflect the apparent 
asymptomatic manifestation of MERS-CoV infection, in-
dividual differences in susceptibility, or both (2). Also, pri-
mary infections may result in a short-lived antibody peak 
followed by a rapid waning of antibody, depending on virus 
 
 
 
Table. Results	of MERS-CoV	serologic	testing of humans	with	and	without	dromedary contact, Qatar,	2013–2014* 
Exposure	type,	cohort Country 
Serum	samples tested	by 
S1	assay,	no.	
positive/no.	tested	 
PRNT90,	no.	positive/no.	tested† 
S1-positive  S1-negative  
Dromedary contact  20/294 10/20 1/35 
 A,	slaughterhouse	workers     
  A1,	camel	slaughterers Qatar 4/5 2/4 (40,	20) NT 
  A2,	sheep	slaughterers	(contact	with	camels/camel	 
  slaughterers) 
Qatar 3/104 2/3 (20, 20) 1/16	(20) 
 B,	central	animal	market	workers Qatar 1/8 0 NT 
 C,	barn	workers	at	international	camel	racing	track Qatar 4/22 3/4 (40, 40,	20) NT 
 D,	camel	farm	workers Qatar 8/155 3/8 (40, 40,	20) 0/19 
No	dromedary contact  0/204 NA 0/48 
 E, construction	workers Qatar 0/56 NA 0/48 
 F, sheep	farmers Qatar 0/10 NA NT 
 G,	specificity	controls     
  G1, recent	infection	with	a	common	hCoV GER,	NL 0/66 NA NT 
  G2,	suspected	infection	with	Bordetella pertussis NL 0/72 NA NT 
*GER,	Germany; hCoV,	human	coronavirus;	MERS-CoV,	Middle	East	respiratory	syndrome	coronavirus;	NA,	not	applicable;	NL,	the	Netherlands;	NT,	not	
tested;	PRNT90,	90%	plaque-reduction	neutralization	test;	S1, MERS-CoV	S1 antigen. 
†Nos. in parentheses are reciprocal antibody titers in PRNT90. 
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and host properties (12), as seen in influenza A(H5N1) virus 
infection: antibody levels are higher in symptomatic than 
asymptomatic H5N1-infected persons, and antibodies wane 
more quickly during asymptomatic infection (13). MERS-
CoV antibody kinetics and the persistence of antibodies de-
tected by different serologic methods are not known. Such 
parameters are needed to estimate the force of infection on 
the basis of serologic data (14).
MERS-CoV–seropositive participants in this study did 
not report severe health problems, giving evidence for fre-
quent unrecognized human infections. Assuming the health 
histories are accurate, this finding implies that the current 
overall MERS-CoV–associated death rate of 37.1% (1) is 
most likely an overestimation of the actual rate and that 
most infections may be asymptomatic or mild. A major is-
sue to be resolved is whether, and to what extent, asymp-
tomatic cases contribute to the spread of MERS-CoV; it 
is well recognized that variability in disease transmission 
exists among humans (15).
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